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This chapter has two purposes: first, to compare the "information ma-
nipulation" version of the availability effect argument that was developed
in chapter 4 with alternative explanations that have been or might be de-
veloped to explain the effect. The intent here is to develop suggestions
for distinguishing empirically between the models, and to spell out the
different implications of accepting any particular model. Second, this
chapter will develop and use an empirical technique to test for the
presence and causes of the availability effect.
Medical Need, Availability Effect, and the Economic
Concept of Demand
The discussion of the availability effect in almost all of the noneco-
nomic literature has implicitly been based on the principle of "medical
need" or what Fuchs has called the "monotechnic" point of view.
1 In
its strongest form this principle asserts that, for any set of preexisting
symptoms or complaints, there is a unique, appropriate, and necessary
course of treatment, which has unique resource or input requirements.
Neither individual preferences nor costs are relevant. For example, there
is a specific set of indications for appendectomy or hernia repair. If the
indications are present, the procedure "ought" to be demanded and per-
formed. If they are absent, it ought not to be performed. It follows that,
for a population with a given distribution of symptoms, there should be
a unique number of procedures which ought to be performed, and a
unique set of inputs which ought to be used to perform those procedures.
While adherents of this view recognize that there may sometimes be
vagueness about the necessity of a particular procedure, they do not
usually discuss what will or should then determine what is to be done,
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other than to suggest that additional clinical trials would settle the
matter.
2
The critical feature of the medical need approach is that what should
be done is held to depend only upon the patient's physical and mental
condition. It follows therefore that if the presence of inputs, of surgical
specialists for example, is correlated with use when the prevalence of
conditions is known or assumed to be constant, there is prima facie
evidence of "demand" or use creation. If surgical rates vary when sur-
gical manpower varies but surgically treatable pathology does not, excess
resources must be creating "unnecessary" use. Note that this approach
blends or combines normative and positive aspects: demand creation
occurs when use varies for reasons for which it ought not.
The economic approaches to be discussed below differ from the med-
ical need approach in that they permit use to be determined by more
than just the patient's physical condition and possibly some socioeco-
nomic characteristics. In particular, his tastes or desires, the price (real
and monetary) that he pays, and the resources at his disposal are held
to be things which affect his use. More than this, there is often the im-
plicit normative judgment that, at least in principle and in some situa-
tions, these variables ought to affect what he gets. In this approach, then,
demand creation requires one to look at both health or condition indi-
cators and economic variables before attributing any residual influence
to an availability effect.
Viewed as a positive theory of behavior, the economic approach is
much less likely to label a given act of behavior as demand creation.
Suppose, for instance, a patient has insurance which covers all hospital
costs. Suppose there is some newly developed, exotic, and expensive
procedure for which facilities have just been installed and which prom-
ises him a positive but slight improvement in his expected health. If the
patient uses that procedure, this would not be regarded as demand crea-
tion; it should only be regarded as satisfaction of his (large) demand
at a zero price; supply is responding to demand. The installation of the
equipment does not create the demand for improvement in health; it is
only the supply response to previously unsatisfied demand. A physician
would not be acting in the role of agent for his patient if he did not
recommend the procedure. The physician might, especially if he is some-
what unorthodox, recognize the true waste involved in this transaction,
and so label it the "technological imperative," but it would not be a
manifestation of demand creation. If the patient, supposing he were truly
informed, chose not to have the procedure done, but the physician ma-
nipulated information to get the patient's approval, that would be re-
garded as demand creation.67 The Availability Effect
Economic Theories of the Availability Effect
In what follows I will concentrate on availability effects for physi-
cians' services. Hospital care will be considered in a later chapter. The
data will not permit empirical analysis of other types of medical care.
There are four kinds of theoretical explanations of the availability
effect to be investigated:
1. The availability effect arises from statistical properties of the esti-
mation procedure.
2. The availability effect represents the response of use to changes in
the time or convenience cost of care.
3. Medical services are subject to chronic excess demand, and care
is rationed by physicians on the basis of the interest or severity of cases,
but excess demand is reduced when the availability of physicians is
increased.
4. Physicians create demand by manipulating the information they
provide to consumers; when more physicians are present, they alter
information to induce consumers to use more care.
These explanations are obviously not mutually exclusive. Conse-
quently, a test which supports one theory does not necessarily disprove
another. Moreover, because a number of natural theoretical variables
will not be measured (and may not be measurable) directly, proxy
variables will have to be selected. As a result, the failure of an empirical
test to confirm a theory may only indicate that inappropriate proxy
variables were chosen, not that the theory itself is incorrect.
Data Selection and Statistical Properties
It is clear that trying to estimate a separate availability effect from
aggregate data will involve a severe identification problem. The demand
equation of interest is of the general form
(1) QD = D(P,X,Z)
where QD is quantity of some medical input demanded, P is its (user)
price, X is a vector of other demand parameters, and Z is a vector of
measures of input availabilities. In most demand studies, observations
on use per capita and availability have been taken from geographic
aggregates.
The problem with such an approach is that not all of the right-hand
side variables are exogenous, nor is (1) the sole equation determining
observed use Q. One of the other equations would, for example, be a
production function:
(2) Q = Q(Z)68 Chapter Five
If some demand variables are omitted, if supply responds to demand,
and if more inputs are needed to supply this output, there will neces-
sarily be more use where there are more inputs. But there is no inde-
pendent causal effect. Input availability does not cause more use; rather,
when people desire more use, more inputs become available.
It has been noted less frequently that ostensible demand creation
could also arise because of measurement error in demand variables.
Suppose, as is very common, user price is measured only imperfectly.
But suppose that supply responds well to an increase in quantity de-
manded induced by a decline in user price. In effect, supply availability
may be a better proxy measure of true user price than is measured price.
In such a case, price elasticity would be underestimated (because of
errors-in-variables bias) and the demand creation effect would be over-
estimated. These problems will tend to be most severe when observa-
tions consist of aggregates over the size of a market area (e.g., a state
or SMSA).
In such cases there is likely to be still another source of bias if popu-
lation is measured accurately, and data on use and input availability are
taken from the same source. For instance, hospital admissions and hos-
pital beds are usually drawn from the same American Hospital Associa-
tion survey. But such surveys may omit some possible observations—
e.g., the AHA survey omits both Veterans Administration hospital beds
and admissions to such hospitals. Then the coefficient on the independent
variable will again be biased upward as a measure of the effects of inputs
on total use.
In general, if equation (1) were estimated using actual values of Z, it
is clear that the coefficient on Z might be biased upward. This bias might
be avoided by using predicted values of the Z variables in a two-stage
procedure. But there may still be problems: there may not be an exoge-
nous variable in the supply equation with which to identify the demand
equation. To see this, consider the most fully specified model, that of
Fuchs and Kramer.
3 In a technical sense, their approach is free of the
omitted demand variable problem because they treat physicians per
capita (MD*) as an endogenous variable, and so estimate the demand
equation in which MD* enters by 2SLS. They therefore use a predicted
value for MD* rather than the actual value, and this predicted value
should be free from correlation with any omitted demand variables.
However, the exogenous variables which are used in the first stage to
predict MD* are either explicitly demand variables, or, what is more
serious, they are variables which might not really be exogenous, but
rather would themselves be correlated with the omitted demand vari-
ables.
For example, one of the most important variables in the MD* equa-
tion is hospital beds per capita. But as was argued above, and as will be69 The Availability Effect
developed in more detail in chapter 6, it seems more reasonable to sup-
pose that beds and physician time are jointly demanded to produce
hospital output. Neither physicians nor beds are exogenous. This effect
is even stronger in the Fuchs-Kramer study, since interstate variation
in their measure of physician visits per capita (the dependent variable
in the demand equation) depends strongly on variation in hospital bed-
days per capita, because physician hospital visits are estimated by using
the number of bed-days. For both of these reasons, it is likely that much
of the positive relationship between MD* and beds arises from their
mutual dependence on omitted demand variables. The other important
predictor of MD* is the number of medical schools in the state (not
medical schools per capita, or per physician; apparently medical schools
are a public good as far as physicians are concerned). It would again
appear to be a reasonable conjecture that, if more medical schools in a
state do mean more physicians, those states with unusually high demands
for physicians' services would be expected to have more medical schools.
Again, this variable could be correlated with omitted demand variables.
This is a specific illustration of the general difficulty of finding "truly
exogenous" supply variables for a product whose output does not depend
on weather or geography. A better choice would have been some deter-
minants of real physician income, such as temperature, extent of urban
amenities, or golf courses per capita, or possibly some measures of gov-
ernmental restrictions on physician flow. Fuchs and Kramer did try
some of these variables, but apparently they were not strongly related to
MD. In a more recent study of the demand for surgical services, Fuchs
was able to relate the surgeon stock to hotel expenditures per capita as
a proxy for locational desirability.
4
One way to mitigate these problems is to avoid aggregated data. That
is, instead of using per capita demand in a market area, which is surely
going to be related to area-wide levels of omitted variables, one could
use as observations the quantities demanded by individuals. It is less
likely that the number of physicians will respond appreciably to unusu-
ally high or low demands by a single individual. One can only say less
likely, not unlikely, since it is possible that any omitted variables might
affect all persons in an area in a similar way. If, for instance, all or
almost all people in South Dakota have unusually low demands for
physicians' services, perhaps because of a common ethnic background,
then the omitted variable problem returns. If however, the variance
within areas of some characteristic is sufficiently large, and especially
if it is large relative to the variance across areas, input availability can
safely be treated as exogenous to a given individual. For these reasons,
and also because of other desirable aspects of the data, individual obser-
vations will be used in the empirical analysis which follows.70 Chapter Five
Nonmoney Price and the Availability Effect
There is one omitted demand variable which should be given special
attention. Suppose the number of physicians in an area is increased
exogenously. The money price of their services may fall. But, in addi-
tion, the time and inconvenience cost of seeing a physician is likely to
be reduced. Distances will be shortened, the possibility of waiting in
queues reduced, and so on. As Acton
5 has shown, the time cost of
ambulatory physicians' services may be large relative to the money price
or cost. Consequently, even with money price held constant, an altera-
tion in input availability may have a substantial effect on use if it affects
the time cost of care. (Quality might also be affected.)
It may be possible to construct a test to suggest whether the avail-
ability effect arises from a change in the time cost of care. Let the total
price of a unit of care be given by
(3) P = PM+Wt
where PM is the (user) money price, t is the time spent per unit of care
obtained, and W is a measure of the opportunity cost of time.
Suppose all buyers wait approximately the same length of time. Sup-
pose that increases in physicians per capita reduce waiting time by the
same amount for all persons. Newhouse and Phelps
6 have shown that
(4) y)
•"» - PM + wt -
where r}qt is the elasticity of demand with respect to time and e is the
elasticity of demand with respect to total (money plus time) price. It
follows directly that changes in physician stock will reduce time cost by
a larger amount for high wage persons. Since time cost is a larger frac-
tion of total cost for high wage persons, equation (4) implies that, if e is
the same for all persons, the elasticity of use with respect to physician
stock r]qm will vary positively with W. While it is likely that higher wage
persons will seek medical care which has a higher money cost and a
lower time cost, it seems reasonable to suppose that money cannot be
substituted for time to such an extent that total time cost will be less.
(If PM equalled zero for a low-income person, then r)qt would equal e,
and would be greater than r)qt for other persons. However, persons in
households with incomes low enough to make them eligible for Medicaid
are omitted from the sample that will be used.)
Since in practice W and income often vary together, and e may de-
cline with income, availability elasticities may not differ significantly.
In the empirical work, I shall make some attempt to control for income
while W varies. Note finally that if, instead of being constant elasticity,
the demand curve is assumed to be approximately linear in P and q,71 The Availability Effect
then € will increase as W (and P) increase, making the predicted vari-
ation in 7]qm with W even more likely.
Time cost may also be relevant for understanding differences in the
availability effect between urban and rural areas. It is often alleged that
there is a relative "shortage" of physicians in rural areas. Indeed, the
per capita number of physicians is substantially less in such areas. Time
cost may therefore be high in such areas. If time cost is higher in rural
areas and if relative money prices are the same in rural and urban areas,
a given percentage change in physician stock should produce a larger
percentage change in total price in rural areas. To the extent that the
availability effect operates through a change in time cost, the elasticity
of use of care with respect to physician stock would therefore surely be
positive and probably greater in rural than in urban areas. While nominal
money prices are lower in rural areas, so is the cost of living, so that
relative prices may be sufficiently uniform to permit this test.
Excess Demand
Excess demand exists when the quantity demanded of some service
exceeds the quantity supplied at a given price. If excess demand for
physicians' services exists at current prices, it is possible that an increase
in supply of physicians may cause the observed quantity used to increase
with no change in money prices. The case is clearest and neatest when
excess demand occurs because of price controls imposed on exogenously
determined input supplies. If price is below the market-clearing price,
quantity supplied will fall short of quantity demanded. Now let there be
an exogenous increase in inputs available to produce care (physicians,
beds). The quantity used at the fixed price will increase: this might be
called an availability effect.
Of course, if price controls exist everywhere (though at different
prices below the equilibrium one), the "demand" elasticity that will be
observed empirically will have the wrong sign, since the estimated rela-
tionship will actually represent points on a supply curve. If price controls
exist in some places from which observations are taken but not others,
one may observe both a negative demand elasticity and an "availability
effect," neither of which will be accurately measured.
The price control model is not very realistic, since, except for the
Economic Stabilization Program and some kinds of Blue Shield reim-
bursement mechanisms (now largely disused), prices are not fixed. One
can argue that if prices respond slowly to excess supply or demand, the
actual situation may approximate price controls. But this leaves the
uncomfortable questions of why prices respond so slowly, and whether
one observes equilibrium or disequilibrium in a cross section.
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A more complete answer is provided by arguing that there are reasons
why the price might stay below the market-clearing level. All of these
reasons involve entering either the magnitude of excess demand or the
price itself in the provider's utility function. In what follows I will first
consider alternative theories of physician behavior that might be con-
structed to explain the existence of permanent excess demand.
Feldstein
8 was the first economist to suggest that physicians may get
utility from excess demand; this was one of his explanations for the
upward slope of his estimated "demand" curve for physicians' services.
(He also argued that lower prices give physicians utility.) The notion is
that physicians maintain a queue in order to be able to select "interest-
ing" or urgent cases.
Feldstein appealed to the existence of a chronic doctor shortage since
1946 as evidence for the existence of such utility functions. Exactly
what the evidence is for this shortage, and its dimensions, was nowhere
stated. However, it will still be useful to present a model of equilibrium
nonprice rating.
I assume that each physician has a utility function of the form U — U
(Y,a ) where Y is money income and a is the fraction of total cases
seen that is regarded as interesting. I assume that hours of work are
fixed at L, and that output (number of cases seen) depends only on
hours of work. Each physician is assumed to be confronted with a pro-
rata share of the market demand curve. Of the total demand (or per
physician demand) at each price, the fraction otD of cases is interesting.
However, the physician is assumed to be unable to charge different
prices for interesting and uninteresting cases. For example, it may not
be possible for the patient (or physician) to identify beforehand which
initial visits will be for interesting conditions. Thus, if each physician
sets price at the level which clears the market at QD = Q8 = Q(L),
then <x = aD. However, if physicians value interesting cases, they may
be willing to reduce prices below the market clearing level. That is, the
only way to induce demand for initial and subsequent visits for interest-
ing cases may be to set an initial price below the market-clearing level,
and then select interesting cases from the queue thus generated. The
marginal equilibrium condition here (holding quantity supplied Qs con-
stant) is:
where Ua is the marginal utility of the proportion of interesting cases,
and UY is the marginal utility of income. It is easiest to explain this
condition by considering a small change in price. The benefit from re-
ducing price by one dollar is a gain in the fraction of interesting cases73 The Availability Effect
of aD—=r= . But the cost is a reduction in income of Q&. The physician
Us
will create excess demand for his services as long as the benefit from
doing so exceeds the cost.
Since the cost of cutting price by one dollar, or Q8, is positive for
even the initial price reduction from the market-clearing income-maxi-
mizing level, it is possible that a physician who values interesting cases
may still decide not to cut the price. The cost may just be too high. But
if he does decide to cut price, the effects of such behavior may be to
increase his utility, and price may settle to some value below the market-
clearing price. Now let the number of physicians be increased. If price
is held constant and if a is held constant, income will decline. If a is a
normal good, each physician will reduce his desired level of a by draw-
ing down his queue. (The initial price is likely to no longer be the
equilibrium price.) Total output will increase, but the increase in output
will consist entirely of uninteresting cases. This discussion shows a way
of determining whether any observed availability effect may be attrib-
uted to this cause. In particular, the elasticity of use with respect to the
number of physicians per capita should be less for cases labeled as
interesting, or for persons with such cases, than for uninteresting cases.
The "interest" or "severity" on the basis of which rationing occurs
is, of course, that which is perceived by the physician. Insofar as there
are a priori reasons why physicians and patients might differ in their
estimates of severity for particular kinds of cases, then another test of
this kind of theory would involve determining whether the response for
those kinds of cases which physicians do not deem to be severe is larger
than for those cases which physicians do regard as severe. Such a test
would require proxy ing severity by symptoms or by diagnosis, or by
physician and patient attitudes toward symptoms and diagnosis.
Alternative bases for rationing other than severity yield alternative
predictions about differences in the availability effect. It is possible, for
example (as also suggested by Feldstein), that excess demand may arise
if price enters the physician's utility function. Suppose demand increases
for a type of care for which a critical physician input is in perfectly
inelastic supply. A price rise could reequate demand and supply, but
physicians may recognize that its only function is to transfer income from
patients to physicians. Accordingly, they may neglect to raise prices, and
ration on the basis of severity or interest. But the higher patients' in-
comes are relative to physicians' incomes, the less this kind of benev-
olent rationing is likely to occur. Thus one would predict that the
response of use to availability should differ by severity, but that these
differences should be greater the lower the relative incomes of patients.
If severity itself enters the physician's utility function, there would be
no such difference.74 Chapter Five
The precise determination of whether excess demand exists or not is
difficult because queues do not necessarily mean that price is too low,
any more than the existence of inventories means that the price is too
high. When demand is stochastic, a profit-maximizing firm may choose
to hold inventories, or to permit queues to develop; either way the pro-
duction process is smoothed out. Which strategy is chosen depends,
roughly speaking, on which is cheaper. Having groceries wait for people
in the supermarket rather than vice versa makes sense if the costs of
maintaining inventories are less than the costs of delay. Having people
wait for doctors rather than vice versa makes sense if the cost of doctors'
time exceeds that of the cost of patients' waiting time. What is actually
chosen is some mix of queues and inventories: there are occasional
delays at the supermarket, and doctors sometimes have time for a cup
of coffee. // prices could be adjusted with this variation in demand,
some (but probably not all) queues would disappear; but such adjust-
ment is probably itself too costly. One can be certain that excess demand
exists only if there is always a queue, and it is not clear that this obtains
even for "busy" doctors.
One final question is whether the behavior predicted by these theories
might also be predicted by, or at least consistent with, long-run profit-
maximizing behavior on the parts of physicians. Unfortunately for the
purposes of hypothesis testing, the answer seems to be yes.
It may be, for instance, that most people have a kind of implicit con-
tract with their physician. Because it is too costly to vary prices with
urgency and demand, the physician agrees to let the patient jump the
queue at no increase in price for serious illness if the patient will wait
(patiently?) in the queue when the complaint is nonurgent. This permits
the physician to even out his patient flow, thus increasing his produc-
tivity and lowering the price he needs to charge. Thus it is possible to
concoct a profit-maximizing explanation of both (1) the regular doctor
and (2) taking the most serious cases first. Hospitals will do the same
if they do what physicians want.
Measuring Information Manipulation
In the information manipulation theory, the demand equation of in-
terest has the general form
where Q
ijD is the quantity of a given medical service demanded by per-
son i in area /', P
i} is the user price (net of insurance) paid by person i,
X
1 is a vector of person /'s demand characteristics (including his state of
health, and A
j is the level of accuracy he experiences. It is assumed that
A
j is the same for all persons in a given area.75 The Availability Effect
It will be possible to obtain reasonable approximations of QD, P, and
X. But A cannot be measured directly. Instead, as suggested by the
earlier discussion, the level of accuracy chosen by the representative
physician will depend upon the gross price level, the quantity that each
physician can sell at that price, and the level of the physician's subjec-
tive marginal opportunity cost. I will assume that the marginal cost
curve is the same for all providers. With gross price P
j held constant,
total quantity demanded in an area depends on the mean area-wide
values X
j of the demand parameters (including others' insurance cover-
age). The demand per physician then depends on the number of physi-
cians. Thus we can write:
(2) A* = A (F, MD**, X*)
where MD*
j is the stock of physicians per capita in area / and P
} is the
gross price received by physicians in area /. Note that A is greater the
larger the demand per physician. So while an individual's demand for
physicians' services would be greater the sicker he is, it would be smaller
the sicker everyone else in his community is, because in the latter case
the physician would have less incentive to create demand.
Substituting the equation for A into the demand function gives
(3) QDV = Q(P*i, X\ X\ MD*>, Pi)
Since P** = INS
lP
j, where INS* is the fraction of /'s expenditure not
covered by insurance, the actual estimating equation will be
(3') Q% — Q(INS\ P\ X\ X*,
Since P
j has effects on consumer demand both directly through the user
price and indirectly through incentives for demand creation, it is not
desirable to impose the constraint that changes in INS
1 and P
j which
have the same influence on P*
j should have the same influence on de-
mand. In particular, changing P
ij by changing INS
1 should have a larger
effect on quantity demanded than that from changing P
j, since changes
in the prices paid to physicians provide offsetting incentives to create
additional demand. In the data to be used there is no measure of the
marginal or average fraction of expense covered by insurance, only an
indication of whether or not the individual is covered by hospital and/or
medical-surgical insurance. A dummy variable for INS is therefore used
in the regressions. This procedure is equivalent to assuming that all
persons who have insurance have the same coverage.
Target Income
A final kind of theory that contains elements of all of the preceding
ones is the so-called "target income" theory. This theory was first sug-76 Chapter Five
gested by Newhouse and Sloan,
9 but has received its most extensive
development by Evans.
1
0 In its simplest and most naive form, the theory
assumes that physicians have target money incomes and target work-
loads they wish to achieve. Both are chosen with reference to what is
acceptable or usual in the community and in the profession. Productivity
and the level of other inputs held constant, the target workload deter-
mines output Q. Given input prices and Q, the physician then chooses
the gross output price that achieves the target income. If the Q chosen
in this way exactly equals the Q corresponding to this gross price on
some market demand curve, then demand is just satisfied. If Q is less
than the quantity demanded, excess demand prevails. If Q is greater
than the quantity demanded, actual Q will be increased as physicians
"order extra work for patients, perform unnecessary or marginally neces-
sary operations, or recall patients for extra visits."
1
1 Increases in the
number of physicians will in either case result in an increase in actual
Q at any price—an availability effect will be observed.
In its simplest version, the target income theory is consistent with an
availability effect which arises either from the drawing down of excess
demand or from demand creation. It simply makes observed demand
depend on the number of physicians. If a distinction is to be made be-
tween a target income theory and any other theory, that distinction must
be based on a presumed fixity in the incomes, real or money, that physi-
cians desire.
If desired or target income is assumed to be fixed, the theory makes
a definite qualitative empirical prediction which permits it to be distin-
guished from maximizing models. It predicts that an exogenous increase
in gross price will lead to a reduction in the quantity of services per
capita supplied and used. For if quantity were held constant, then in-
come would rise. To keep it at the target level, quantity must fall.
1
2
The information-manipulation theory, however, is consistent with the
finding of a positive or zero effect if the substitution effect of a price
increase (which represents a greater reward for more business) offsets
the income effect.
While Evans seemed initially to support the naive target income the-
ory,
1
3 his "more extended model" allowed actual workload to depart
from desired workload. More importantly, he allowed desired work-
loads to be a positive function of price, which makes it possible for price
and quantity used to be positively related. He used casual empiricism on
the Canadian experience to suggest that the relationship will still usually
be negative, but the "extended" theory as such cannot be refuted. In-
deed, as Sloan and Feldman have shown,
1
4 any outcome with respect to
the relationship between physician stock and price or aggregate use
would be possible under the "extended" theory.77 The Availability Effect
These alterations make Evans' models indistinguishable from the de-
mand creation model discussed in chapter 4; they rob the target income
approach of any distinctive qualitative empirical predictions. In order
to preserve this distinction, in what follows I shall regard the target
income approach as the initial, naive model. Evans' "more extended
model" will instead be identified with the information manipulation
theory.
Data Sources and Variable Measurement
In this section some empirical tests of alternate theories of the avail-
ability effect will be provided. The basic source of data on individual
use and individual characteristics is the 1970 Health Interview Survey
of the National Center for Health Statistics.
1
5 This survey consists of the
results of a questionnaire administered to about 110,000 persons in
39,000 families on their health, use of medical care during the past
year, and socioeconomic characteristics, including insurance coverage.
From A.M.A. and A.H.A. data sources, I obtained information on the
number of physicians of various types, hospital beds, and gross prices
of hospital and physician services in the "primary sampling units"
(PSUs) from which the sample was drawn. PSUs are counties, groups
of counties, or SMS As. For 22 large SMS As that are identified on the
tape, the actual values of the PSU-level variables could be used. For the
other PSUs the National Center for Health Statistics attached a set of
decile rank orders of each of the variables to each of the PSU codes.
I then substituted for the decile rank orders the population-weighted
mean values of each of the variables for each combination of decile
rank orders. In most cases, this procedure will associate a unique set of
values for the area variables with each PSU. The variables used in the
empirical work are as follows:
Dependent Variables
Three measures of utilization:
1. Physician visits, last 12 months. This includes telephone calls but
excludes visits to hospital inpatients. Because of the recall period, there
may be some error in measurement.
2. Hospital episodes, last 12 months, in nonfederal, short term hospi-
tals.
3. Average stay per episode (equals hospital days divided by hospital
episodes).
Independent Variables and Abbreviations
Personal Variables:
1. Restricted activity days, last two weeks (RAD).78 Chapter Five
2. Number of chronic conditions (CONDS).
3. Age (AGE).
4. Sex, 1 if female (SEX).
5. Female of childbearing age dummy (F15-44).
6. Family size (FAMSZ).
7. Work status: whether individual is currently employed or not
(WORKING).
8. No insurance coverage (NOINS): indicates whether the indi-
vidual is covered by hospitalization or surgical insurance or
Medicare or not. About half of the surveyed families were
asked this question, so in most of the analysis only observa-
tions on persons who were asked this question were used.
However, restricting the data set to families who answered the
question would lead to small cell size for the high education
group in all but the large metropolitan areas. Accordingly, an
insurance coverage variable is not included for high education
families in other metropolitan or rural areas.
9. Family income in 100's (FAMINC).
PSU Variables:
10. Office based M.D.'s per 100 persons (OBMD*).
11. Surgical specialists as a fraction of office-based M.D.'s (SURG/
MD).
12. General practitioners as a fraction of office-based M.D.'s (GP/
MD). The variables GP/OBMD and SURG/OBMD measure
the proportion of total office-based physicians who are general
practitioners and surgeons respectively. They capture any dif-
ferences in the quality or characteristics of a typical patient
visit, as well as differential specialty effects, if any, on demand
creation.
13. Hospital based M.D.'s per 100 persons (HBMD*)—mainly
residents, interns, and other hospital-salaried physicians.
14. Nonfederal short-term hospital beds per 100 persons (BEDS*).
15. Hospital cost per patient-day for nonfederal short-term hospi-
tals in the PSU (HOSCOST).
16. Population density (POPDENS).
17. Physician office visit fee (MDFEE). Two measures are used.
The fee measure used for all areas is the fee screen for Medicare pa-
tients for followup office visits. This screen is supposed to represent the
seventy-fifth percentile of the prevailing distribution of fees in various
geographic areas. However, since different procedures are used by dif-
ferent carriers to set up the fee screen, the accuracy of this measure is
unknown. When there were different fees for general practitioners and
specialists, a weighted average was used. For the 100 largest SMSAs,
Mathematica, Inc. conducted a telephone survey in 1973 to ascertain79 The Availability Effect
the fee for a routine office visit to a primary care practitioner,
1
6 and this
measure should be an accurate index of fee levels for such services.
Accordingly, results for office visits for the 22 largest cities are presented
using the Mathematica prices as well as using the Medicare fee screens.
In principle, cost-of-living differences should be taken into account
in estimating monetary variables (income and fees). A complete set of
such indexes is available from the Bureau of Labor Statistics only for
the large-city subsample, not for all other cities or for rural areas. A
comparison of regressions using undeflated and deflated data for the
large city subsample will suggest whether the absence of deflation biases
coefficients on the variables of interest.
Classification of Results for Physician Visits
Results for physician visits are presented for several different data
sets. First, persons are classified by the number of physicians in the
market area in which they live: the 22 largest SMS As, in which it would
probably be very difficult for consumers to get reliable information on
any individual physician; nonmetropolitan areas, in which such informa-
tion is presumably easier to obtain; and other, smaller metropolitan
areas, which might be expected to be intermediate.
The information manipulation theory would suggest that availability
might have a greater influence in those large metropolitan areas in which
individuals have difficulty determining the quality or accuracy of the
advice which any individual physician provides. An excess demand the-
ory, on the other hand, would predict that availability effects would be
most likely to be observed in rural areas, where physician stock is low-
est and excess demand presumably the greatest.
Second, results are presented for persons in households in which the
heads have different levels of education. Education level is intended to
be a proxy for the prior stock of information. In most of the analysis,
results will be presented for two extremes of the distribution of educa-
tional attainment—persons in households in which heads are not high
school graduates (low head education) and persons in households with
heads with college degrees or better (high head education)—for the
reasons discussed in chapter 4.
Where an availability effect is detected, the sample is further subdi-
vided in ways which, it is hoped, correspond to differences suggested by
other theories of the availability effect. The survey did not ask about
wage income or hours, but it did ask whether or not the person was
employed. It would seem reasonable to suppose that, money income
held constant, adults who are working have a higher time cost than
adults who are not. Another method of division is by number of chronic80 Chapter Five
conditions, which may serve as proxy for illness severity or physician
interest in the case.
Two alternative methods of estimation were used. Since there is a
concentration of observations at zero, especially for the low education
group, ordinary least squares regression on all observations would yield
incorrect estimates. Tobit regression is usually the appropriate technique
to be used.
1
7 However, there are reasons to fear that tobit may not be
theoretically appropriate for the question being investigated here, as has
been suggested by Newhouse and Phelps.
1
8 Physician advice can only
influence use if the consumer first contacts the physician to seek his
advice. The initial decision to seek advice should not be influenced by
physician information; although physician availability may influence this
decision, it will do so through changes in nonmoney price. Once a per-
son has made at least one visit, then he will potentially have received
some physician advice and be subject to an information effect. Accord-
ingly, analysis of the subsample of persons with positive doctor visits is
more likely to display an information effect than is analysis of the total
sample. Of course, not all of the persons with positive numbers of visits
will have been subject to information manipulation; there may be several
initial visits, for a series of illnesses, included in the data. Moreover, the
censoring issue discussed earlier suggests that those with positive visits
may be more susceptible to information manipulation than those with
no visits. Nevertheless, the set of those with positive visits may still be
more appropriate for investigation of an availability effect than the full
sample. Such analysis of nonzero observation can be done using OLS,
since there is less of a concentration of observations at a lower limit.
Two kinds of person are omitted from the sample. Persons with
household incomes below a poverty line are dropped because their use
is likely to be covered by Medicaid and so not responsive to changes in
fees. Those with more than 52 physician visits in a year are also dropped
in order to avoid bias from extreme values.
The full specification described in the section "Measuring Information
Manipulation" indicates that area demand variables as well as individual
demand characteristics should be included in the equations. Several such
area demand variables—percentage of population covered by Medicare,
percentage of under-65 population with private health insurance (for
the state in which the SMSA is located) and percentage of population
under age 5—are available for the 22 large cities. Accordingly, results
with regressions which include these variables are also presented.
Empirical Results: Physician Ambulatory Visits
The primary prediction of the information-manipulation theory is that
alterations in accuracy should have less effect on those with sufficiently
larger prior stocks of information. There are two primary proxies for81 The Availability Effect
incentives for alterations in accuracy suggested by the theory: the num-
ber of physicians per capita, and the gross price of a unit of output.
The two major questions of interest are: (1) whether availability
effects are shown and (2) if effects are shown, whether they differ across
educational groups. Table 5.1 shows the coefficients for OLS regressions
of physician visits during the preceding 12 months for persons with posi-
tive physician visits. Different regressions are presented for persons in
the two separate education groups and in three different geographic
areas; means and standard deviations are shown in appendix table 1.
Table 5.2 presents similar tobit regressions on the full sample of persons.
For the reasons discussed above, the availability effect is most likely to
be observed in the positive visits sample, and so these results will be
discussed first.
Availability variables
The three availability variables are OBMD*, HBMD* and BEDS*.
OBMD* has a significant and positive coefficient for the low education
group in two out of three geographic areas. The size of the coefficient
(and the elasticity) is much larger in the large urban areas than in the
rural areas. For high education families, however, the coefficient on
OBMD* is negative and significant for the large urban areas, and insig-
nificant elsewhere. HBMD* tends to have the same sign as OBMD*, but
to have a lower significance level. BEDS* is not usually significant.
Application of an F-test for differences in the sets of coefficients across
education groups finds that the set of coefficients on the two education
groups is significantly different in all three area subsamples. In addition,
the coefficients on OBMD* and HBMD* do differ significantly between
the low and high education regressions in two of the three areas.
The remainder of the area variables are occasionally significant, but
there is no consistent pattern. The proportion of physicians who are
G.P.'s does not affect the ambulatory visit rate, while the proportion
who are surgical specialists tends to depress the rate, but to a significant
extent only for high education families. While none of the coefficients
differs significantly across education groups, there is some weak evidence
that surgeons may substitute away from ambulatory care toward hospital
care. However, the results for the effect of surgeons on hospital use, to
be presented later, do not confirm this suggestion. Another plausible
explanation is that surgical specialists treat conditions with fewer ambu-
latory visits even when they do not substitute inpatient hospital stays.
The physician's fee is not significant for high education families, but
does have a significant and positive effect for the low education families
in smaller metropolitan areas.
Other demand variables have generally expected coefficients. Both
restricted activity days and number of chronic conditions are strongly
related to the doctor visit rate. Older persons tend to make more visits82 Chapter Five
as do females in general (in low education families) and females of
childbearing age. Family size has a slight tendency to reduce the visit
rate, while workers make fewer visits than nonworkers.
These results are consistent with the information manipulation theory
of the availability effect. When an availability effect is observed, it is
positive and significant for the low education families in two out of three
areas. (The negative and significant effect of OBMD* for high education
families in large cities may reflect a change in the quality or character of
a visit when physicians are more plentiful.) There is also a positive and




















Physician Visits Regressions: Persons with Some Physician Visits
(ordinary least squares)














































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































NOTE: Means and standard deviations are shown in appendix table 1.
metropolitan areas, again offering evidence for demand creation (but
against the naive target income theory).
1
9
It is also worth noting that, although there is an availability effect for
low education families in rural areas, that effect is much smaller than
in large urban areas. Since rural areas are supposed to be areas of great-
est physician "shortage," one could conclude either that the shortage is
relatively mild, or that the potential for demand manipulation in such
areas is limited by better consumer information on the accuracy of in-
formation provided by individual physicians.85 The Availability Effect
The results of tobit analysis are shown in table 5.2. While these
results are not conclusive, and while there is no precise way to test the
hypothesis, the results are consistent with the notion that the effect of
physician availability on whether or not people ever see a physician in a
year can be different from the effect on the number of visits they make,
given that they make at least one visit. While many of the coefficients
are similar in sign, the tobit analysis does yield results for the high
education/large urban group which are quite different from those for the
persons in the same group with positive doctor visits. The insignificant
coefficient of OBMD* in the tobit regressions may be a composite of a
significant negative coefficient for those with positive visits and a posi-
tive effect on the probability of seeing a physician at all. (It might be
possible to develop a statistical test, analogous to an F-test, to determine
whether the structures of the OLS and tobit samples are different.) The
availability variables in the other regressions tend to have similar signs
in OLS and tobit specifications, as do the personal characteristic vari-
ables.
Because a large availability effect was detected for the large urban
subsample, additional analysis was performed on it. First, variables
measured in money were deflated by a cost-of-living index, with little
change in results (table 5.3). Absence of such deflators for the other
two area subsamples is therefore unlikely to affect results. Next, area-
wide demand variables were added to the regressions. The variables










Physician Visit Regressions Using Deflated Money Variables,
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* Because of the absence of data for some areas in which the SMS A crosses state
boundaries, the sample size is slightly reduced for the regressions with area de-
mand variables.87 The Availability Effect
65, and (3) percentage of population with some health insurance. As
shown in table 5.3, this addition decreased the estimated magnitude of
the availability effect, but the changes were small. Coefficients on all of
the areawide variables were negative, as expected, although the only
significant coefficient was for areawide family income in the high educa-
tion subs ample. It does not appear that omission of such variables makes
a substantial difference, and an F-test indicates that the set of area
demand variables does not significantly increase the explanatory power
of the regression. Finally, use of the possibly more accurate prices from
the Mathematica survey yielded approximately the same coefficients as
the use of the other price measure.
Because of the large positive availability effect for the low education/
large urban subsample, that subsample was further disaggregated to
examine alternative theories of the availability effect. The information-
manipulation theory is not refuted by the chronic/nonchronic illness
distinction. As shown in table 5.4, the increase in use in response to
more physicians is obviously not confined to, nor is it larger for, those
with zero chronic conditions. Of course, we cannot be sure that those
with chronic conditions are really more severely ill, or that their visits
are more desired by physicians, although Friedman offers evidence to
suggest that they are.
2
0 It is also possible, as suggested by Grossman and




The comparison between the effect on working and nonworking adults
fails to support the time cost theory (table 5.4). The coefficients and
elasticities on OBMD* are not statistically different between those who
work and those who do not. There is no evidence that the response of
working adults to a reduction in the availability of physicians (as a proxy
for time cost) is greater than that of nonworking adults.
Is the Availability Effect Important for Ambulatory Care?
Determining the reason for any observed availability effect was the
primary purpose of this study. However, the results appear to be con-
sistent not only with the hypothesis that the response of use to physician
availability differs across education groups, but even with the hypothesis
that the effect is important only for low education families.
In order to get an idea of the overall importance of the availability
effect for ambulatory care, persons with other levels of education were
added to the sample and the regressions rerun. In principle, it would
have been preferable to permit interactions between education or loca-
tion and all of the independent variables, but the large sample size made88 Chapter Five
Table 5.4 Physician Visits
Households with
Regressions, Persons with Some Visits in
i Low Head Education: 22 Largest SMSAs,
Selected Subsamples
Regression Coefficients {t statistics in parentheses)






























































































































































































































Physician Visits Regressions, Aggregated Samples:
Some Physician Visits
(OLS)


























































































































































































Regression Coefficients (t statistics in parentheses)
22 Largest Nonmetro-




















such a procedure prohibitively costly. Dummy variables for education
of head and/or location were included in the regressions.
As indicated in table 5.5, physician stock has a positive but statisti-
cally insignificant effect in each of the three location subsamples even
when all education groups are combined. When data are combined for
all variables and all education levels, one does find that the coefficient
on OBMD* is positive and significant at the 90% level. Even here the
coefficient is numerically quite small. With such a large sample, statis-
tical significance is usually to be expected. Moreover, the F-tests de-
scribed above suggest that it is not proper to combine the subsamples
and constrain coefficients to be equal across subsamples. Accordingly,
it seems appropriate to conclude that a positive availability effect for
persons with positive physician visits is difficult to detect, quite small in
magnitude if it is found, and may be due only to specification error.
2
2
For ambulatory visits, then, there appears to be little or no availabil-
ity effect when other variables (including health measures) are properly
controlled. It seems safe to conclude that, for the general population,
the availability effect in ambulatory care can safely be ignored.